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Abstract
This paper examines the Bracero Program and its implementation from the start of World
War II to the end of the program in 1964. Farmers and planters in America needed a sufficient
labor supply once the war started, and Mexico became the main supplier. The Bracero Program
was initiated as a war effort and meant to only last until the end of the war, but the planter elite
had far different intentions once they realized how productive and inexpensive the program
could be. This paper identifies the leading causes for how the Bracero Program was able to last
over twenty years.

Table of Contents:
Introduction: A Reason for Bracero Labor and the Implications Involved……………………….1
Chapter One: Bracero Program Historiography…………………………………………….…….6
Chapter Two: The Lee Wilson & Company Braceros…………………………………………...24
Chapter Three: The Benefits and Effects of the Bracero Program in Arkansas…………………40
Conclusion:………………………………………………………………………………………52
Bibliography:…………………………………………………………………………………55-56

1
Introduction: A Reason for Bracero Labor and its Implications

At the height of the Great Depression the national unemployment rate hovered around
twenty-five percent. The economic catastrophe crippled the industrial economy and caused
immense hardship all across the country. The supply of unskilled workers in the United States
was plentiful; employers all across the country could find labor to harvest their crops. The Great
Depression gave credence to the old adage “one man’s loss is another man’s profit,” at least for
farmers and planters. In the late 1930s, the threat from an increasing conflict in Europe created a
sudden war mobilization. This mobilization opened job markets and helped shrink
unemployment. With the United States bracing and preparing for conflict, the industrial economy
began to hire more and more labor. During World War II, American men, black and white,
devoted their lives to the defense of American values and freedom. Once the conflict began, a
labor shortage developed, especially in the agricultural South. The demand for industrial workers
in northern cities, such as Chicago, Detroit, and Pittsburg, exacerbated the labor shortage. The
industrial labor demand initiated a massive rural to urban migration, particularly on the part of
southern African Americans who had been the main labor source for planters and farmers. The
solution adopted by the United States government was to work with the Mexican government to
recruit Mexican laborers into specific areas of the country.1 This will examine how American
farmers and planters used their influence over politicians to extend the Bracero Program beyond
World War II.
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When the United States officially entered World War II, the governments of Mexico and
the United States engineered a program for the “importation and employment of “braceros,”
literally “arms,” and the Hispanic equivalent of the Anglo word “hand,” meaning a laborer
available for hire.”2 The United States Immigration Service (USIS) was responsible for
coordinating with the Mexican government. The USIS worked hand in hand with farmers in the
United States and coordinated with the Mexican government by allowing Mexico to select the
workers on a term-by term -basis. Each contract was based on where, when, and what type of
labor was needed. This initiative became known as the Bracero Program.
“The agreement stated (United States Executive Agreement series 278, 1943:3) 1.
Mexican Laborers shall not be subject to the military draft. 2. Discrimination
against braceros is forbidden. 3. They shall be guaranteed transportation, food,
hospitalization and repatriation. 4. They shall not be used to displace other
workers nor to lower wages. 5. Contracts made by employee and employer will be
made under the supervision of the Mexican government and shall be written in
Spanish. 6. Expenses incurred for transportation and lodgings from point of origin
to destination shall be paid by the employer who will be reimbursed by subemployer. With regard to word and salary, the principal points were: 1. Salaries
shall be the same as those made to citizens of the U.S.A and shall not be lower
than 30 cents an hour. 2. Exceptions as to wages can be made under extenuating
circumstances provided authorization by the Mexican government is given. 3. No
minors under 14 will be allowed to work. 4. Braceros will be allowed to form
associations and elect a leader to represent them. 5. They shall be guaranteed
work for 75 percent of the working days. 6. Savings shall be deducted from their
pay and Banco Nacional Agricola shall take charge of the money until the
braceros return.”3
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The 1942 agreement between the United States and Mexico was beneficial for both
countries. In the United States farmers were able to request Mexican labor for a designated
amount of time by submitting applications to the government. This allowed them to fill their
labor needs without hiring in the fall and firing workers once the harvest was completed. The
Bracero Program also gave American farmers the ability to negotiate their labor needs without
worrying about the demands of labor unions, and it made it much more profitable to hire
temporary workers compared to domestic workers. Domestic workers needed year-round
employment and in the capital-intensive environment of post-war agriculture, year-round labor
was no longer necessary. Once American farmers realized the economic benefits of renting labor
from Mexico, it became a full-fledged agricultural industry. For Mexico, the Bracero Program
provided the opportunity to assist in the war effort. It also gave Mexican labor an opportunity to
work for a higher wage, some of which made its way back to the Mexican economy.
Under the Bracero Program a farmer requested, through the United States Agricultural
Extension Agency, a certain number of temporary workers. The American farmer would have to
agree to the duration of the contract, the pay rate, and the type of work to be done. Once the
contracts were signed by all parties, the process of transporting the braceros to the farms would
begin. To ease the cost for farmers, the United States insisted that the bracero processing centers
be located near the border between Mexico and the United States. The two border checkpoints
used by Arkansas farmers were located in Hidalgo and Brownsville, Texas. Once the contacts
were complete, it was the responsibility of the farmer to pay for transportation costs back to the
border checkpoints. Unfortunately, this placed the cost of transportation to these border locations
completely on the laborer. Upon arrival at the border processing centers, the braceros would be
subject to a rigorous screening process. For example, “at the US labor reception center, the
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worker and his luggage are thoroughly dusted with DDT powder as a sanitary measure and to
prevent insects from being brought into the US.”4 The laborer was then subject to an x-ray and a
photograph then it was attached to the individual’s passport. After these processes were
complete, the braceros were ready to be transported, and planters fulfilled that part of their
bargain. Unfortunately, many of the vehicles were substandard and overcrowding was the norm.
In fact, “the transportation resulted in the largest number of accidents and safety violations they
experienced.”5 Once they arrived at their work sites, it was very difficult for the bracero to
complain or voice his concerns over any type of issue. In many cases, the braceros were
expendable, because “the threat of returning a contractee to Mexico if he did not meet the
demands of the job without complaint was usually enough for workers to conform to grower
expectations.”6 This made it very difficult for the braceros to affect any type of change if they
felt their situation was unfair. The threat of deportation prevented most protests and made it easy
for planters to disregard any type of bracero protest that did arise. In other words, “growers could
rely on fear rather than violence to keep workers in line.”7 Also, while working in the United
States braceros were consigned to labor camps where they were separated from the rest of
American society. This was designed to allow planters to monitor their whereabouts at all times
and to segregate the braceros from domestic workers and the public. Once the braceros
completed their contracts, it was the responsibility of the planter to return the bracero back to
Mexico.
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The Bracero Program continued after World War II and operated for a total of twentytwo years. The program brought more than four million temporary Mexican workers to the
United States.8 The program had tremendous implications within the agriculture sector of the
United States, in particular the Arkansas Delta. This study examines how Arkansas planters
mobilized their political and economic influence over Arkansas politicians to support the
advancement of the Bracero Program and limit the power held by local labor. Most studies in
U.S. agricultural history focus on African American labor, the impact slavery had on agriculture,
or general agricultural shifts, especially once slavery ended. However, this research focuses on a
different category of agricultural labor. This thesis uses primary documents and secondary
sources to understand why farmers, the United States, and Mexico worked together to implement
the Bracero Program. The sources will shed light on how and why it was utilized by large
planters and landowners, in particular Arkansas plantation owner, Lee Wilson.
This research addresses key issues that surrounded the Bracero Program, specifically in
Arkansas, and its impact on the local community, in particular the local labor. More importantly,
it addresses why plantations, such as that operated Lee Wilson & Company, were determined to
rely on the Bracero Program for its labor force and began using their influence over government
officials, such as Senator J. William Fulbright and Governor Orval Faubus, to gain a more
favorable outcome. Another vital issue this research examines is the effect mechanization and
industrialization had on the implementation of the program and why it was favorable for planters
to use their economic power to influence political elites into adopting the program, especially in
regards to large plantations, such as Lee Wilson & Company.
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Chapter One: Bracero Program Historiography
The historiography centered around the Bracero Program has taken several different
approaches. Scholars have focused on planters influencing the political establishment to adopt
the Bracero Program and they have highlighted the attitude of local labor toward the program
and how the political elite neglected their discontent in favor of the planters’ economic agenda.
Along with understanding the impact on the local labor force, this research explores why and
how plantation owners took advantage of the Bracero Program. The program was implemented
in 1942 as a war measure, it benefitted farmers all across the agricultural United States, and it
became evident that it was important, economically, for both the government and planters, to
sustain a productive output during the war. However, the program survived long past the
declaration of peace and was not disbanded until 1964. The Bracero Program survived after
World War II because it could supply a sustained and cheap labor force for American planters.
The following sources have been arranged from oldest to newest publication, and are not
arranged according to content. Each will shed light on how and why the program was utilized by
large planters and landowners.
The Bracero Program was utilized throughout the United States, especially, and most
significantly in California where seasonal workers were an essential component of agriculture.
California’s enormous and varied food productions dictated its participation in attracting bracero
labor from Mexico. The oldest scholarship relating to the Bracero Program in California is by
Ernesto Galarza, Merchants of Labor: The Mexican Bracero Story: An Account of the Managed
Farm Workers in California 1942-1960. Galarza highlights the background of Californian and
Mexican societies. As the preface, by U.S. Senator from Alaska Ernest Gruening, makes clear
California dealt with massive political corruption and pressure from wealthy planters. Planters
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used their influence over politicians to maintain the program long after the war. First, Galarza
chronicles the need for agricultural labor during World War II as the main reason California
planters turned to bracero labor. Coupled with an inability to find and secure sufficient labor, and
the fear of an actual shortage of food during the war the United States government negotiated
labor bonds with the Mexican government. The United States wanted Mexico to provide
transportation costs for the braceros from their homes to the border checkpoints. Mexico wanted
the United States to provide the transportation costs for the braceros from the border checkpoints
to the farms, and then back to the border checkpoint once their contracts were completed. The
government supplied planters in California with braceros from contracting centers over eight
hundred miles away, and had them on the farms in just forty-eight hours. Galarza claims the
ability of the government to supply California planters with Mexican labor was a major factor in
allowing the Bracero Program to flourish. “In California the hinge of an enormous input of more
than 500,000,000 man-hours to raise 33,000,000 tons of agricultural products was the bracero
labor force, which in 1957 numbered over 100,000.”9
The railroads and the agricultural sector needed laborers with different skills; regardless,
according to Galarza, the qualifications held by braceros were appreciated by major railroad
companies and commercial farmers all across the American south. According the Galarza, the
railroad companies considered braceros to be very hard workers, and they were well versed in
railroad construction since Mexico had a budding railroad industry at the time of the program.
Galarza claims planters desired braceros because they could be hired easily through government
channels, they could be counted upon to appear to work on schedule, contracts could be made
without negotiating with labor unions, and the individual contract could be overseen by the
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planter. Another major issue that Galarza highlights is the ability of the Bracero Program to
reduce the social cost of unemployment since it allowed the planter to send the braceros back to
Mexico when they were no longer needed. It is clear that planters and landowners held influence
and power over the political processes, and Galarza claims the United States government tipped
the scales farther in the favor of property owners and agribusiness. Galarza argues this resulted in
an implementation of an administered democracy because the laborer had a choice to become a
bracero, but once he became a bracero he was not able to make his own choices, in regards to the
type of labor he performed. It also further exposed the bracero labor force because it helped
planters dictate contractual agreements once the braceros were on the farms. At the end, Galarza
reflects on how the Bracero Program affected the bracero home communities and the
communities they entered. The braceros were under constant surveillance, and in some cases, the
planters were fearful enough of absconded braceros that they surrounded the labor camps with
barbed wire. Galarza explains that these barbwire camps were constructed primarily for symbolic
purposes, and unfortunately, “a more effective barrier surrounded them- the social justice created
by difference in language, customs and familiar patterns of character and behavior,”10 which
meant no matter how hard the braceros worked they would never be viewed or considered equal
by Americans.
In Bracero Experience: Elitelore Versus Folklore, Maria Herrera-Sobek enhances our
understanding of bracero life by balancing the interplay between elitelore and folklore and using
oral histories to advance the Bracero Program methodology. Unlike Galarza, Herrera-Sobek does
not examine or even hint at the corrupt politicians who used their power to benefit the planter
elite in the United States. By using tape-recorded interviews and firsthand accounts of the
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experience of braceros, she is able to create a compelling portrait of conditions on American
farms. She also observes that the literary elite in Mexico did not participate in the Bracero
Program, and this fact, created a negative explanation of bracero experiences in the United
States. Herrera-Sobek explains that the lack of understanding and relationship between elite
Mexican novelists and braceros made the bracero experience become an embarrassment to the
intellectual historians of Mexico. In many instances, elite Mexican novelists portrayed the
returning bracero as a bitter and broken man. “Although Mexico’s novelists thought that they
were right in protecting Mexico from the loss of some of its best labor, in reality they tended
indirectly to help convince the bracero of his inferiority.”11 In effect, the novelists and
intellectuals were using their power and influence to criticize the Bracero Program, and felt it
was necessary to discredit and demean the impact of the braceros in Mexican history.
Herrera-Sobek’s decision to select differing villages with varying socioeconomic
characteristics in Mexico allowed her to create a composite story of the bracero experience.
Herrera-Sobek does not place one hundred percent of the blame for the negative impact of the
Bracero Program in Mexican history on the Mexican elite. She places a majority of the blame on
the United States agricultural regions that requested foreign labor for their farms and subjugated
them to demeaning treatment and racist attitudes. However, in many accounts, the braceros she
interviewed were “either oblivious to prejudice that the Anglo-Saxon segment of the U.S.
population might have directed at them or unconsciously repressed the idea altogether.”12 She
makes it clear braceros were more interested in the possibility of bettering their lives through low
wages in the United States over low wages in their native Mexican villages. According to the
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braceros, the decision was made because even low wages in the United States equaled to a high
exchange rate once they returned to Mexico. For example, “the rate of exchange was 12.50 pesos
to 1 dollar,” and one bracero told her “as long as Mexican workers come home with radios, cars,
clothing, and dollars, there will be a constant stream of them trekking to the United States.”13
Herrera-Sobek concludes her research with the realization that Mexican workers will always
look to the United States as a land of economic prosperity, especially compared to their native
land. Herrera-Sobek’s outlook seems to have become a reality. “Until Mexico can provide
adequate employment for its jobless, its destitute campesinos, braceros will continue to be part of
the United States-Mexican scene whether in the form of “wetbacks” or “wire jumpers.”14
The Tracks North: The Railroad Bracero Program of World War II, by Barbara Driscoll,
separates itself significantly from the research by Herrera-Sobek, but it does resemble the
research completed by Galarza. While Galarza focuses mainly on the labor in California, in
which both railroad and agricultural labor are examined, he still devotes the majority of his book
to addressing the role braceros played in the California agricultural labor force. The Tracks
North: The Railroad Bracero Program of World War II, by Barbara Driscoll, documents the
factors and negotiations that created the Bracero Program, specifically in the railroad industry,
and highlights the “remarkable fact that this short-lived program remains the only binational
migration agreement between Mexico and the United States that both parties respected in its
original form.”15 Driscoll makes it clear the railroad industry was not as influential or successful
as the agricultural industry, especially in maintaining the Bracero Program, however, Driscoll
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does point out the braceros’ contribution to the railroad system “represents a singular and
pivotal, albeit largely unknown, chapter of Mexican immigration to the United States.”16 The
railroad companies were not building new lines, but they did need constant maintenance, and the
braceros held important work experience that benefitted the railroad companies.
Although, the railroad industry only utilized the Bracero Program from 1943 to 1945, it
employed over 100,000 Mexican workers at more than thirty different railroad sites.17 Driscoll
says railroad employers were just as pleased as the planters were over the work ethic of the
braceros and the ease with which they could be hired. According to Driscoll, the major
difference between the Bracero Program in the railroad industry and the agricultural industry was
the control held by powerful railroad unions. As he puts it, “the railroad bracero program was
implemented in spite of the presence of large and powerful railroad unions in Mexico and United
States.”18 Fortunately, for domestic workers, the railroad unions were able to use their influence
over the United States government to end the Bracero Program- as far as railroads were
concerned- once the war emergency was over. Driscoll states, “in spite of efforts of the railroads
and some U.S. bureaucrats to extend the railroad program beyond the war, for example, the
brotherhoods had merely to remind the United States government that the negotiations had
limited it to the war emergency.”19
This analysis provides a stark difference between the power and influence held by
domestic railroad workers compared to the lack of power and influence domestic agricultural
workers held over the United States government, and it highlights the tremendous influence
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unions had with government officials. If the domestic agricultural workers would have been able
to unionize they could have used their power to combat the power held by planter elites, thus
decreasing the planters’ ability to hire Mexican labor through the Bracero Program. Driscoll
claims the railroad portion of the Bracero Program “stands out as the only successful binational
immigration project implemented by the U.S. and Mexican governments,”20 because it is the
only instance where the Mexican government was able to negotiate significant results that would
protect Mexican laborers. In regards to the agricultural Bracero Program, Driscoll highlights the
measures planters made to supply labor in their fields before the program was implemented. In
many cases planters, especially in predominately agricultural states, recruited workers from
outside the agricultural labor force. Unfortunately, even whole communities stopping their usual
activities to work in the fields did not prove to be a sufficient solution for planters.
In Guest Workers or Colonized Labor?: Mexican Labor Migration to the United States,
by Gilbert Gonzalez, the focus is on how Mexico has been prized and exploited by the United
States for its natural resources, and most of all its cheap labor. According to Gonzalez, the
international relationship the United States has with Mexico “bears the imprints of imperialist
domination.”21 Gonzalez uses this idea to identify the social consequences of imperialist
domination, particularly the mass uprooting of migrated labor from Mexico to the United States.
Gonzalez claims most historians have been reluctant to compare the Bracero Program to an
imperialist scheme because it can be described as a unique agreement between two sovereign
nations. In Gonzalez’s opinion, the Bracero Program conforms to an “imperialist schema,”22
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because it comprises a series of government measures designed to recruit and organize Mexican
labor for purposes beneficial to the national interests of the United States. Gonzalez provides
ample evidence to demonstrate his argument, and he claims the Bracero Program paralleled
colonial labor practices used by Britain and France during the spread of colonialism. According
to Gonzalez, under the auspices of the Bracero Program, Mexican workers were transported to
the United States as indentured servants and systematically placed under planters’ control. Since
they were placed under employer control, it was easy to segregate the workers from domestic
labor and to deny them certain key labor rights, such as the right to organize into unions, the
right to negotiate fair wages, the right to protest and the right or ability to change employers.
Gonzalez says “little if any oversight enforced rights and privileges legally accorded to the
laborers.”23 Another example Gonzalez highlights is the low standard of living afforded to the
braceros. He claims, as other historians have pointed out, that braceros were subject to harsh
working conditions and poor living situations while in the United States. He also points to how
planters themselves held long standing imperialistic ideas toward their labor force.
Gonzalez focuses on the planters’ ability to blacklist Mexican workers with rebellious
tendencies or lazy work performance as evidence of a commonly applied colonial practice.
Gonzalez makes three major arguments to bolster his claim that the Bracero Program resembles a
colonial practice. The economic relationship between Mexico and the United States, exhibits
“the classic hallmarks of neocolonialism.”24 Gonzalez suggests American business owners
dominated the Mexican economy by investing in mining, agriculture, banking and financing
institutions, which strengthened the United States economic position over Mexico. He claims the
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Bracero Program was a variation of a migration pattern that had been happening for half a
century. As he suggests, “migration here is explained through acknowledging the critical impact
effected by U.S. imperialism upon the demography and social organization of the Mexican
nation.”25 Gonzalez cites the work of Galarza when he claims the wages and working condition
standards found in the United States did not compare to those in Mexico and presented Mexican
labor with an opportunity to better their lives and enhance their economic livelihood. In other
words, the low wages in the United States were considerable better than the highest wages
available in Mexico. Finally, Gonzalez emphasizes and compares European migration with
Mexican migration. He says it is not possible to use European migration as a “one size fits all”26
because there is a significant cultural divide between Mexico and the United States. He argues
that European immigrants had an easier time adjusting and assimilating in the United States, and
in many cases were provoked to migrate to the United States for different reasons than Mexican
immigrants. Gonzalez claims Mexico’s neocolonial status, in the eyes of the United States, “as
the precondition for migration to the United States and for the subsequent Mexican immigrant
experience within the United States.”27
Overall, Gonzalez explores the result of United States economic influence over the
migration of Mexican labor, specifically the Bracero Program, and how it was a “quintessential
expression of imperialism.”28 Gonzalez believes examining the Bracero Program within the
imperialist domination context allows historians to “engage more realistic explanations regarding
the U.S.-Mexico relationship and its offspring- migration- and thereby establish valuable
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approaches to the more important aspects of Chicano history.”29 Gonzalez sought to elucidate the
conditions brought on by the Bracero Program, which he claims ripped apart the Mexican
countryside and initiated widespread labor migrations. His analysis centered on how the program
served the economic interests of American employers, and how the program integrated Mexican
workers into the United States economy using imperial and colonial style tactics. “Using such an
approach, we are bound to arrive at the conclusion that there is no such thing as a “good” guest
worker program, inasmuch as all such programs depend upon the continual availability of
uprooted people without options, refugees of an economic policy leading toward the
recolonization of Latin America.”30
Dr. Rocio Gomez, a professor of Latin American and environmental history at the
University of Arkansas, explored the experience of braceros who worked in the Arkansas Delta.
Gomez’s approach, which supports most of the recent historiography, differs from the
mainstream Arkansas agricultural scholarship because she believes the impact of Bracero
immigrants has been ignored “despite their presence and driving force of the cotton sector in the
1950s.”31 Gomez’s research is based around the Bracero point of view, which differs greatly
from the research this paper has focused on. Gomez painted a vivid picture of the tumultuous and
rigorous process the Braceros had to endure on their journey from Mexico to the Arkansas Delta.
Gomez used firsthand accounts of Braceros who explained the hardships they faced while
working in the Arkansas Delta, the tremendous stress caused by the plantation owners and how
they adjusted to things like the climate and the new types of land/crops they were cultivating.
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Gomez also focuses on the Braceros who decided to stay in the United States once their workvisas ended and how they accomplished the act of staying in the United States. Gomez also
points to the implications mechanization and industrialization had on ending the Bracero
program in the Arkansas Delta.
The role mechanization and industrialization played on the Bracero Program in Arkansas
can also be highlighted through the work of Jeannie Whayne. Whayne’s most recent book, titled
Delta Empire: Lee Wilson and the Transformation of Agriculture in the New South, provides a
significant source of information on why plantation owners, such as Lee Wilson took advantage
of the Bracero labor. Whayne argues that planters, like Lee Wilson, turned to bracero labor
because the transition to capital-intensive agriculture led to the “erosion of the tenancy and
sharecropping system which insured a virtual depopulation of the rural countryside.”32 This
argument serves as a vital point for this research because it shapes the backdrop of the Great
Migration. Whayne also argues, however, that the Bracero Program gave planters more control
over labor and, particularly, the wage rate. She cites testimony to a presidential Commission on
Migratory Labor, which held hearings from July 31st to September 16th 1950, that said there was
plenty of domestic labor available. The commission agreed, recommending to the president that
“Further efforts should be directed toward supplying agricultural labor needs with our own
workers and eliminating dependence on foreign labor.”33 Congress ignored the advice of the
commission, however, and the Bracero Program expanded.
Whayne’s research provides important insight into why and what caused planters to adopt
bracero labor, along with the influence their economic prosperity had over local politicians. The
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cotton plantation was undergoing a fundamental reorganization, one that began during the New
Deal. During the first phase of this transition, the Agricultural Adjustment Administration paid
farmers and planters to limit the production of certain crops – like cotton – and inadvertently
created a labor surplus. Planters ceased planting up to 25 percent of their acreage in cotton and
many resorted to evicted tenants and sharecroppers because they no longer needed their
labor. The second phase of the transition began with World War II when a labor scarcity
emerged. Many landless farmers enlisted or were drafted into the armed services and others
went to work in the defense industry. The bracero program came into existence in order to
address that labor shortage. As Whayne shows, few braceros were used in the Arkansas delta,
however, as sufficient prisoner-of-war labor existed. The third phase of the transition began after
World War II. It was during the war that the first mechanical cotton harvester came off an
assembly line and planters began to adopt their use in the post-war period. Planters once again
needed labor but many of the men who went off to war or to work in war industries did not
return to rural areas. Many others did return, however, and that became a point of contention
when planters urged the continuation of the Bracero program in order to fill their labor
needs. The native laborers expected a certain guarantee of year-round labor rather than seasonal
labor planters were becoming accustomed to in order to harvest their crops. Another facet of this
third phase was increasing use of weed-killing chemicals. This greatly curtailed – and ultimately
eliminated – the need for chopping cotton to rid the fields of weed during the summer. Now
planters needed labor only a few weeks in the summer to chop the cotton and a few weeks in the
fall to harvest it. Under the old tenancy system they had found it necessary to keep a labor force
year-round in order to provide sufficient hands for planting and harvesting season. Under the
modern system, they no longer had that need. While some native labor remained in the
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plantation areas, the Bracero Program provided an attractive alternative of laborers who could be
closely monitored and paid a low wage without the threat of protest.34
While Whayne focuses on the impact of the Bracero Program on agricultural workers in
the Arkansas Delta and their role in providing labor during an important transition period
between labor-intensive and capital intensive agriculture, Ronald Mize and Alicia Swords, in
Consuming Mexican Labor: From the Bracero Program to NAFTA, examine another angle.
Mize and Swords view the Bracero Program as a systematic exploitation of Mexican labor by the
United States and place much of the blame on the United States government and the planters
who failed to live up to the original contracts. They also observe that consumption and
production in the United States are tied to Mexican migration. They examine how North
America’s “consumption practices are shaping particular labor needs in terms of low-wage and
marginalized conditions where Mexican immigrant workers are increasingly recruited to
work.”35 Their central argument is that the economic relations between the United States, Canada
and Mexico are “inextricably intertwined”36 because the consumption based economies are built
on the labor of Mexicans. They explore how the social relations of production and consumption
in the United States and Canada shape Mexican migration patterns and labor production. They
use the time span from 1942 to the present day to “present these relations as constituting a triad
that includes capital accumulation, labor exploitation, and consumption practices in the making
of Mexican labor for North American consumption.”37 In regards to the Bracero Program, they
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analyze the program and the post-war experiences of Mexican labor, and how each contributed
to the United States economy’s reliance on Mexican labor.
An essay by Julie Weise, “The Bracero Program: Mexican Workers in the Arkansas
Delta, 1948-1964,” focuses on the Braceros and the actions they took to solidify and expand their
benefits as workers. Weise highlights how Braceros used the Mexican governments’ agreement
with the United States as a political bargaining chip with landowners. Weise argues that this
bargaining chip allowed them to break down Jim Crow discrimination, and enabled them to
succeed “in forcing farmers to reject overt anti-Mexican discrimination and to admit darkskinned foreigners into white establishments as early as 1948.”38 Weise’s essay is key to
understanding the importance the Bracero Program had on the Arkansas Delta in terms of
disrupting the Jim Crow mentality, since the program and its stipulations forced landowners to
abandon Jim Crow habits or risk losing the benefits of the program. Weise’s conclusion,
regarding the power and influence landowners held over economic issues, shows the braceros
“eluded the rigid structures of Jim Crow, but did not escape the economic, social, and cultural
caste system it had created.”39
Weise’s Corazon de Dixie: Mexicans in the U.S. South since 1910 includes a discussion
of the experiences of braceros in the Arkansas Delta, mainly focusing on the discrimination they
faced. Weise emphasizes that racial tension consumed the Arkansas Delta, and she addresses
instances where local whites treated the bracero workers as unequal and refused to allow entry to
white establishments: “local authorities used every means at their disposal- law, culture, and
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practice- to ensure Mexicans’ nominal access to the white public spaces and to defuse racially
charged conflicts as they emerged.”40 This book provides a basis for race relations between local
people and the braceros, especially in regards to how whites reacted to the influx of bracero
labor. A major argument from Weise’s research is the differential treatment plantation owners
gave towards the braceros. Wiese argues that the changes implemented by the United States
government over local officials helped spur the beginning of the destruction of Jim Crow in the
Arkansas Delta. Weise’s research emphasized the ways braceros successfully pressed their claim
for fairness among local whites. She also focuses on how the braceros were awarded better
treatment by the planters, who caved to demands by the braceros and the Mexican government
for personal injury insurance.
Another book that analyzes the Bracero Program is Defiant Braceros: How Migrant
Workers Fought for Racial, Sexual & Political Freedom, by Mireya Loza. The main argument in
this book traces the experiences of the Bracero Program through the eyes of the braceros. Loza
claims this approach’s complexities have been overlooked by countless historians. She uses
memory, race, sexuality and state power to critically examine the “material experiences of
braceros and the discursive power the guest-worker program has wielded.”41 Loza uses bracero
memories to “reveal contradictions within U.S. immigration policy that renders Mexican labor as
necessary and Mexican settlement as unnecessary and unwarranted.”42 Loza determines that
many former braceros have become strong critics of the Mexican nation-state. Loza says the
memories collected from the former braceros “call attention to the dehumanizing nature of the
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program and the Mexican state’s profiteering and complicity in creating a stateless class of
workers primed for exploitation.”43 According to Loza, braceros were already feeling
marginalized by the Mexican government before the Bracero Program started. Loza claims the
bracero population had distinct racial and ethnic identities that “shaped how individuals
understood their place in the racialized landscape of the United States and their relationships
with other braceros.”44 She says this helps answer important questions concerning the racial and
ethnic homogeneous of the bracero population. Loza places the braceros history at the center of
her argument to show how the United States and the execution of the program “created and
perpetuated a distinct racialized system when hiring Mexican migrants.”45
The most recent source that analyzes the Bracero Program is an article by Justin Castro
titled, “Mexican Braceros and Arkansas Cotton: Agricultural Labor and Civil Rights in the PostWorld War II South.” In this article, Castro examines how Arkansas politicians, such as
Congressman Took Gathings, used their political power to influence negotiations and the
implementation of the Bracero Program. According to Castro, Gathings “ardently supported the
bracero program but stood firmly against domestic policies that might include similar provisions
for American workers.”46 Castro pulls evidence from the Gathings collection to show how he
used his political power to help Arkansas farmers push the implementation of the Bracero
Program. Castro also highlights how Gathings used his power to identify distinct differences
between braceros and domestic labor. Castro uses Arkansas “to show how braceros and the

43

Ibid.
Ibid.
45
Ibid.
46
Castro, “Mexican Braceros and Arkansas Cotton,” pg. 30.
44

22
bracero program influenced the U.S. labor and civil rights movements.”47 He uses three very
distinct situations to strengthen his argument. Castro claims braceros “complicated the black and
white narrative surrounding labor and civil rights in the South.”48 This complication forced the
United States to address the issue involving the Bracero Program and the rights of braceros in
comparison to domestic workers. The Mexican government demanded social and economic
protections for each bracero working in the United States, and these demands prompted “U.S.
labor and civil rights activists to demand that the same standards and protections against
discrimination be extended to American workers.”49 Once the standards and protections
afforded to the braceros were realized “politicians and activists who promoted civil rights and
better conditions for U.S. agricultural workers,”50 could use the program to call out hypocritical
south Dixiecrats, such as Gathings..
The secondary sources in this chapter give a broad understanding of the Bracero
Program. Each source provides a different perspective surrounding the program and each helps
the reader recognize how important the program was for American farmers and the braceros.
These sources have supplied a great deal of information to this thesis because each source uses
different research methods, different agricultural regions in the United States and highlights the
importance of the Bracero Program in the United States and Mexico. The historiography
surrounding the Bracero Program is consistent with this thesis because it can be concluded that
politicians were always willing to be influenced by farmers and the planter elite. However,
unlike the historiographies analyzed, this research contains a more extensive view of a very
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distinct area and plantation that took part in the Bracero Program. The following chapter
examines how a specific plantation, Lee Wilson & Company, in the Arkansas Delta utilized the
Bracero Program and fought to keep it in existence.
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Chapter Two: The Lee Wilson & Company Braceros
In the Arkansas Delta, the most important time of the year is harvest time. Once the
harvest begins, planters have a limited amount of time to secure the crop and thus produce the
most profit from their crops. The need to realize a return on the investment was a driving factor
in their pressure on politicians to secure the Bracero Program. On the other hand, changes to the
program gave them a reason to voice their concerns once their economic returns were limited,
especially after the 1949 bond agreement, which stated that the braceros were to be afforded
individual health insurance for on and off the job site. It also stated that planters would be
charged a fee for each bracero that was not safely returned to Mexico once their contracts were
complete. The majority of planters voiced their concern because they felt the insurance was not
necessary and they felt the fee charged was being unfairly applied to them. In many cases,
planters placed the blame of costly financial penalties on the poor negotiations between the
United States Immigration Service and the Mexican government. The information and data that
follows analyzes how Lee Wilson & Company was affected financially and culturally by the
Bracero Program.
In the mid-twentieth century, the Arkansas Delta held enormous agricultural importance.
The fertile soil, abundance of available water and the determination of landowners made it the
epicenter of Arkansas agriculture. One of the most productive counties in the Arkansas Delta
was Mississippi County. Located in the northeastern corner of the state and along the Mississippi
River, it was the largest cotton producing county in the South at the height of cotton’s
supremacy. The most important and wealthiest plantation in Mississippi County was operated by
Lee Wilson & Company. At its height, Lee Wilson & Company included more than 65,000 acres
of land and cultivated cotton, corn, alfalfa and soybeans. The company even used its influence
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to run and organize a town, famously named Wilson. The town of Wilson was the focal point of
operations and included, cotton oil mills, a cooperage factory, a stave mill, a bank and other
businesses. The company divided its farmlands into thirteen district units, each with its own
general store and farm manager. The farm managers planted acreage in specific crops according
to the dictates of the general farm manager who was housed in the headquarters in Wilson, but
they had considerable authority over how farming activities were carried out on their units and,
particularly, over the treatment of laborers.51
Like other plantations in the mid-twentieth century, Lee Wilson & Company made the
transition to capital-intensive farming and the Bracero Program figured prominently in their
successful negotiation of the transition away from labor-intensive agriculture. Under the old
tenancy system, they had expertly tied their laborers to them through debt and coercion in order
to maintain a sufficient supply of labor. With labor needs declining steadily during the 1950s,
they found it burdensome to keep native labor year-round and viewed it as economically
expedient to turn to seasonal labor such as that offered through the Bracero Program. The Lee
Wilson & Company experience with braceros was typical in many ways. Once Lee Wilson &
Company paid the necessary fee to participate in the program, they were then allotted their
temporary labor. The company provided transportation from the United States border centers to
the plantations, typically packing laborers into open trucks, some of which had been used to haul
cotton, and brought them back across Texas to Northeastern Arkansas. The company was also
tasked with the safe return of the braceros once their contracts were complete. The Bracero
Program became a very successful venture for Lee Wilson & Company, but by 1964 the
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transition to capital intensive agriculture was nearly complete and the company likely suffered
little disruption once the Bracero Program ended.52
While Lee Wilson & Company took advantage of the Bracero Program, they maintained
high production rates, increased their wealth, and were able to limit the amount of money they
paid to their laborers. However, hiring braceros through the Bracero Program did not allow Lee
Wilson & Company to limit their pay to individual laborers. By law and according to contract
agreements, the braceros were to be paid the same wage as domestic workers. However,
domestic laborers had the ability to negotiate for higher wages, an impossibility for braceros.
Even though “labor laws required a minimum wage of $.60 per hour for both domestic and
foreign labor,” few braceros could press the point and “were often paid below that rate.” 53
Fortunately for the braceros, the exchange rate from US dollar to Mexican peso made the lowest
legal domestic wage quite favorable.
The information used in this research was supplied by Jeannie Whayne, who secured the
data from newly discovered files at the Lee Wilson & Company archives. Since this study began
Dr. Whayne has secured information on additional bracero, indicating that a total of 2,224
laborers were on the plantation in 1949. My analysis is based on the first 492 passport cards that
were Dr. Whayne’s possession at the time my study was launched. This represents 22.1 percent
of the total number of braceros on the plantation, a sufficient sample for analysis. I entered the
data into spreadsheets where the information could be accessed and analyzed using the Statistical
Package for Social Sciences (SPSS). The data set provides information on several important
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issues. First, it provides detail on the type of bracero planters and farmers preferred. Second, it
also helps to understand the importance of bond insurance, since each bracero that abandoned
their contract would, by law, cost the farmer a penalty fee. Third, together with invoices from
the USIS in the files, t provides crucial information on the 194 braceros who “abandoned their
contract” in 1949. Although it cannot be certain that the latter were the only braceros who left the
plantation without fulfilling their contracts, it probably reflects an accurate account of those who
were apprehended. Since the company was responsible for returning all braceros assigned to
them to Mexico once the contract was completed, they were charged fees by the USIS to cover
the costs of transportation and incarceration of the fugitive invoices.
At first glance, the number of braceros who abandoned their contracts seem
extraordinarily high- 194 out of 492. It is likely, however, that the USIS invoices and letters
represent the total number of escaped braceros and should be considered as a percentage of the
total number of braceros on the plantation, 194 out of 2,224. In other words, the 8.9 percent of
the braceros on the plantation left without permission and were apprehended by authorities. As
far as can be ascertained from a perusal of the published works on the program, no other record
of abandoners from a single plantation is available, making this a unique window into the
Bracero Program. The visa cards provide a wealth of detail: full names, the age of the braceros,
distinguishing marks, specific origins in Mexico, place of border admission, and which farms the
braceros worked on. The cards also provide information such as, which braceros were able to
write. In many cases, if the bracero could not sign his own name a fingerprint was collected to
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take the place of a signature. Taken together with the invoices from the Immigration Service,
they provide an interesting portrait of the company’s experience using braceros.54
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In regards to distinguishing marks, the United States government had several different
ways of recording an individual braceros’ characteristics. When the bracero was being evaluated
during the medical examination their distinguishing marks would be listed in numerous ways
such as, pockmarked face, scar on left/right cheek, scar on forehead or scar on chin. This
information illustrates how detailed and thorough the observation of each bracero was during the
check-in process. Of the 437 braceros in our data set that we could match with the Master file,
122 had distinguishing marks. The percentages and total number of braceros with distinguishing
marks can be seen in the table below.
Distinguishing Marks
(does not include abandoners we could not match with Master file)
Frequenc
Valid
Cumulative
y
Percent
Percent
Percent
Valid
NONE
315
.0
72.1
72.1
Distinguishing
122
.0
27.9
100.0
marks
Total
437
.0
100.0
Missing System
0

The process to become a bracero started once the Mexican government admitted the
desired amount of men into the program. The terms of the Bracero Program stated that the
Mexican government was obligated to pay the cost required to transport the laborers to the
border checkpoints, which unfortunately fell to the braceros themselves since the Mexican
government was unwilling to pay for the cost of transportation. At first, the Mexican government
wanted the United States and the planter to pay the transportation cost, but once the planters
voiced their disgust the United States demanded a different approach. The braceros secured
transportation to border checkpoints and the planter was responsible for the transportation to the
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ultimate destination. The admission checkpoints stretched along the American/Mexican border.
The two admission centers that were used to admit the braceros hired by Lee Wilson & Company
were located in Texas, one in Brownsville and the other in Hidalgo. Each checkpoint processed
the braceros by completing their visa cards, ordering them into groups for transportation, and
providing contract stipulations. While the braceros were awaiting transport the United States
required each bracero to undergo a strict medical examination. During medical exams the
braceros gave blood, received vaccinations, were checked for hemorrhoids, and sprayed with
DDT. These medical examinations were crude and embarrassing for the braceros, and in many
cases the doctors did not provide sufficient reasons for completing the examinations.55 The
braceros had little experience with American doctors and this made them leery of the idea that
strangers would be conducting such personal examinations. The total amount and percentages of
where the Lee Wilson & Company braceros were admitted can be seen in the table below. This
data does not provide significant detail for specific braceros, but it does show the distance these
braceros had to travel once they were admitted for work at Lee Wilson & Company.

Place of Admission, border
(does not include abandoners we could not match with Master file)
Frequenc
Valid
Cumulative
y
Percent
Percent
Percent
Valid
Brownsville,
176
.0
40.3
40.3
Tx
Hidalgo, Tx
261
.0
59.7
100.0
Total
437
.0
100.0
Missing System
0

55

Gomez, “Braceros in the Arkansas Delta, 1943–1964,” pg. 16.

33

Some inconvenient problems present themselves when analyzing the data. For some of
the abandoners, the identification cards existed, either with the invoice or in the company
records. As the tables below indicate, 55 of the 139 “abandoners” could be found on the Master
List while 55 could not. The data set includes identification cards for 139 abandoners and 298
braceros who fulfilled their contracts with Lee Wilson & Company. However, an additional
problem exists. Some cards were incomplete since they did not have ages or did not indicate
precisely which LW&C farm they had been assigned to. Since there were cards with incomplete
information it is difficult to determine if there were more abandoned contracts other than the
ones we could identify.

Matched with Abandoners or not
Frequenc
Valid
Cumulative
y
Percent
Percent
Percent
Valid
Did not Abandon
298
.0
60.6
60.6
Contract
Abandoner found on
139
.0
28.3
88.8
Master List
Abandoner not found
55
.0
11.2
100.0
on Master List
Total
492
.0
100.0
Missing System
0
0
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Matched Abandoned or Not
Frequenc
y
Percent
Valid
Abandoned Contract
194
.0
Did not Abandon
298
.0
Contract
Total
492
.0
Missing System
0
Total

Valid
Percent
39.4

Cumulative
Percent
39.4

60.6

100.0

100.0

Some interesting observations can be made about the braceros who listed their age on the
identification cards. They ranged in age from 16 to 57, but most of them were in the prime
working ages. Fully 58.8 percent were aged from 21 to 30. The 16 to 20 and 31 to 40 age groups
made up 17.4 percent and the oldest workers, from 41 to 57, represented only 6.4 percent of the
company’s braceros on the data set listed below. When hiring braceros Lee Wilson & Company
made it a priority to acquire workers who could benefit their company and thus they preferred
those of prime working age and condition. This would allow the company to maintain high
production outputs. Since the work Lee Wilson & Company needed accomplished was labor
intensive and required extensive man hours, it became beneficial to have braceros who were in
the prime of their lives. This meant it was in the company’s best interest to hire braceros who
were relatively young, strong, and capable.
There is not a definitive reason why over fifty percent of the braceros were aged from 21
to 30, or why braceros aged 31 to 57 were less than twenty-five percent of the total number,
however, it does leave room for speculation. In many cases the labor situation in Mexico and the
financial incentive for becoming a bracero in the United States encouraged these men to offer
their service to American planters. As for the individual age ranges it is not clear why one set of
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ages were more likely to offer their services, but for the men aged 21 to 30 it could be speculated
that these braceros had little standing in their way. It would have been more difficult for a
bracero aged 31 to 57 to offer their services because of family obligations, a sense of pride, or a
minimal need to explore new horizons. On the other hand, men aged from 31 to 57 may have
decided to become braceros for the opposite reasons. It may have been more beneficial to their
families for them to travel to the United States and work for higher wages. The higher wages
being paid in the United States could be sent back to their family. This in turn would allow them
to increase their family’s livelihood and standard of living. The driving factors for 16 to 30
would have been less about family obligations, and more about their individual freedom, such as
a need to explore new horizons. Equally, the prospect of traveling to the United States as a
permanent destination could have fueled the intrigue for becoming a bracero.
AGES RECODED
(does not include abandoners we could not match with Master file)
Frequenc
Valid
Cumulative
y
Percent
Percent
Percent
Valid
16 TO
76
.0
17.4
17.4
20
21 TO
257
.0
58.8
76.2
30
31 TO
76
.0
17.4
93.6
40
41 TO
28
.0
6.4
100.0
57
Total
437
.0
100.0
Missing System
0
0
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Another interesting picture that emerges from the analysis is the placement of braceros
on particular farms run by the Lee Wilson & Company enterprise. The company had organized
its vast holdings in separate units in order to maximize organizational control, expediency and
production. As you will see from the table below, the information of the exact acreage in each
farm unit is incomplete, but the largest farm units, other than the main Lee Wilson farm, seem to
have been the Armorel and Keiser farms, which together were assigned 129 workers (30.7
percent). Each farm utilized and supervised the labor as separate entities.

Farm Assigned to
(does not include abandoners we could not match with Master file)
Cumulative
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Percent
Valid
Lee Wilson
192
.0
45.7
45.7
Marie
3
.0
.7
46.4
Keiser
68
.0
16.2
62.6
Wren
31
.0
7.4
70.0
Armorel
61
.0
14.5
84.5
Morgan
7
.0
1.7
86.2
Branch
9
.0
2.1
88.3
Crain Bros
30
.0
7.1
95.5
Exp Farm
8
.0
1.9
97.4
Highland
3
.0
.7
98.1
Hickory Lake
3
.0
.7
98.8
Live Oak
5
.0
1.2
100.0
Total
420
.0
100.0
Missing System
0
Total

Our data set also analyzed which farms, 174 out of 194, braceros abandoned, and these
results can be seen in the table below. Lee Wilson farm only had nine abandoned contracts,
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which accounted for 5.2 percent of the total amount. Since Lee Wilson farm had the largest
number of braceros hired, it raises the question, what made this percentage so low? It could have
been that this farm had the best supervision, or the best working conditions. It is hard to
determine, but either reason could explain the low number of abandoned contracts. However, the
most reasonable explanation is that the farm unit labeled Lee Wilson exercised maximum control
over its bracero labor. The conditions, the pay or the supervision must have been lacking at the
other farm units. At the Marie farm the number of abandoned contracts was relatively high
considering their number of total braceros. The Keiser farm was not much better. It too had a
high proportion of abandoned contracts. On the Armorel farm the number of absconded braceros
did not reach the percentages seen at Keiser or Marie, but it was still a sufficient amount to
warrant speculation on why these farms witnessed abandoned contracts. At the Branch farm only
a handful of braceros chose to abandon their contracts. The Crain Bro. farms must have been
lacking in several categories because it had a large proportion of abandoned contracts. The
Experiment farm had several skipped contracts, but accounted for a very small percentage of the
total abandoned contracts. At Highland farm only 6 braceros skipped their contract. The Hickory
Lake farm had 10 braceros abandon the farm. The Live Oak farm had 4 abandoned contracts.
The Morgan farm had 2 abandoned contracts, the Greenwood farm had 3 and the Beall farm had
4 abandoned contracts.
Using the data set, it can be speculated that the farms with the highest percentage of
abandoned contracts were the farms that had the worst working conditions, or more importantly,
the least supervision. In regards to Lee Wilson & Company, the forces that prompted the
braceros to abandon their contracts are difficult to determine through the data we have
accumulated. However, it can be speculated that many of these farms were most likely located in
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the most isolated rural areas where braceros felt comfortable maneuvering away from the farm. It
can also be theorized that for some braceros the prospect of a job in the industrial centers of the
United States, where better jobs and better paychecks were available, could have been a major
driving force to abandon their contracts. After reviewing the data set, it is clear that several farm
units within Lee Wilson & Company were more susceptible to abandoned contracts. Regardless
of the reasons, if a bracero wanted to abandon his contract there was very little Lee Wilson &
Company could do to stop him.

Valid

Lee Wilson
Marie
Keiser
Armorel
Branch
Crain Bros
Exp Farm
Highland
Hickory
Lake
Live Oak
Morgan
Greenwood
Beall
Total
Missing 99
System
Total

Farm Abandoned
Frequenc
y
Percent
9
.0
33
.0
31
.0
21
.0
5
.0
34
.0
12
.0
6
.0

Valid
Cumulative
Percent
Percent
5.2
5.2
19.0
24.1
17.8
42.0
12.1
54.0
2.9
56.9
19.5
76.4
6.9
83.3
3.4
86.8

10

.0

5.7

92.5

4
2
3
4
174
20

.0
.0
.0
.0
.0
.0

2.3
1.1
1.7
2.3
100.0

94.8
96.0
97.7
100.0
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Even with all the financial incentives brought on by the Bracero Program, Lee Wilson &
Company still had a major complaint, especially once the work was complete. From the moment
the braceros were under the planters’ supervision to the end of their contract the planter had
complete control over the braceros’ whereabouts. This allowed planters to keep a close eye on
their financial investments. When a braceros’ contract was fulfilled it was time for the planter to
transport the bracero back to the border centers. This is where things could become economically
complicated for the planter, and in many cases a financial burden, at least from the point of view
of the planter.
This chapter has analyzed an extensive collection of data. The data sets provide a great
deal of information on where Lee Wilson & Company used bracero labor, what age of laborer
they preferred, and how many braceros abandoned the agreed contracts. With the information
accumulated from this data, it is clear Lee Wilson & Company viewed the Bracero Program as a
productive and lucrative means of harvesting their crops. Even when contracts were abandoned
and the company charged a fee, it was still beneficial for the company to hire labor through the
program. The next chapter examines how Arkansas farmers and businesses, including Lee
Wilson & Company, used their influence over politicians to extend the Bracero Program.

40
Chapter Three: The Benefits and Effects of the Bracero Program in Arkansas

By highlighting the reasons Arkansas farmers shifted to Mexican labor, it becomes clear
how and why they used their influence over government officials to sway the United States
Immigration Service toward the Bracero Program. Since farmers were able to influence over
legislative officials, they were able to benefit financially from the Bracero Program. The
economic benefits associated with the program was great for farmers, however, in many
instances the farmers became disgruntled with the United States government over the excessive
expenses being accrued once the bracero contracts were ended. Many of these disgruntled
farmers were upset with the way the United States had negotiated the labor bond of 1949. The
first provision that upset the planters was the penalty they would have to pay if their braceros
were not returned to the border checkpoints after their contracts were complete. In many cases,
the planter would be charged a fifty-dollar penalty for every bracero that did not make it back to
the checkpoint. In the minds of the planters, these charges were unfair, especially since they had
no control over the braceros once they left the plantation. In several instances, planters blamed
poor border patrol enforcement as the reasons braceros were more likely to skip their contracts.
The second agreement that had planters complaining about the 1949 bond was the mandatory
insurance policies they would have to provide for the braceros. Many planters felt the insurance
agreement was beneficial for both camps, but only if they were allowed to use the appropriate
local insurance agency.
Although, much of this research highlights the ease with which planters were able to push
the USIS and other political elites to adopt the Bracero Program, it also provides evidence to
explain why domestic laborers were against the program altogether. Unfortunately, for local
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labor, the influence planters had over political officials outweighed the influence they had over
those same politicians. The political influence planters held over politicians that made them
ignore much of what the common laborers of Arkansas felt was beneficial for their livelihoods
can be seen in the following letters of this chapter. Overall, the research accumulated in this
chapter helps to underscore why and how planters, especially Lee Wilson & Company, were able
to use the Bracero Program to advance their economic interests and influence politicians to
support the program.
The following information has been collected from the University of Arkansas Special
Collections archives. In these sources we will see how Arkansas planters voiced their
appreciation, concerns, and frustrations with the Bracero Program. In many cases these planters,
which include Lee Wilson & Company, wrote letters to local and federal politicians. In the
letters the planters make it abundantly clear that political involvement in the program was greatly
needed. The letters show how important the influence and economic power of planters had
become.
In a letter, dated July 13th 1950, Harvey Adams sent a report to the Agricultural Council
of Arkansas, which was located in West Memphis, Arkansas, addressing the situation involving
braceros who skip their contracts and cost the planters large amounts of cash. Harvey concluded
in his report that the annual agricultural conference stated the USIS “showed thirty-five
individuals or associates in Arkansas having 696 workers missing, which will cost Arkansas
farmers $17,400.”56 This report provides evidence to why planters were willing to influence the
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political elite when it came to how the Bracero Program was negotiated. If their bonds ended up
costing the planters money, it was in their best interests to inform the United States government
of these financial loses.
Another letter referencing the disapproval and overall concern regarding the poorly
negotiated bond of 1949 was a letter from R.S. Barnett. In the letter, dated July 21st 1950,
Barnett, the owner of the Elms Planting Company in Altheimer, Arkansas, voices his concern
over the excessive bond requirements set by the USIS. Barnett explains to Senator J. William
Fulbright that the requirements are unreasonable since “we have absolutely no control over these
men from the time they leave the Mexican border until they return.”57 Barnett suggests that state
and county law enforcement agencies be given the authority to keep the braceros on the jobs they
were contracted. Barnett says “we certainly do not wish to keep these men against their will and
are willing to return them at any time that they wish to go back to Mexico, but it seems
unreasonable to expect us to make a bond guaranteeing their return to Mexico and then give
them the privilege of going where they wish in this country, regardless of their contract.”58
Barnett also blames the ease at which braceros were able to skip their contracts on the lackluster
enforcement of the border by the USIS. John Erickson, Senator Fulbright’s assistant, wrote that
Fulbright would urge others in the Senate to require that a new bond be negotiated.59 This letter
provides evidence to support the fact that planters could use their political influence to impact
legislation once it effected their economic prosperity.
Another piece of evidence that indicates planters were willing to use their political
influence to produce change over the bond of 1949, also emanated from the Altheimer area. In a
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letter, dated July 25th 1950, Charles Willey, the owner of Willey Planting Company, wrote to
Senator Fulbright complaining about the bond agreement. Willey acknowledged that he
complied with the requirements, but found it to be completely unfair. Willey stated “while we,
who are for the most part financially responsible business men with established reputations in
our communities, were under cash bond to return these men, they themselves were under no
bond or obligation whatsoever to return to Mexico or to fulfill their contract.”60 Willey continues
to highlight the failures of the bond agreement by explaining the process taken by the deserters.
“A number of the workers merely used their contract as a passport into the United States and
upon arriving at our farms immediately jumped their contract and migrated to other parts of the
country.”61 He also says there was a marked increase in desertions once the workers neared the
end of their contract. At the end of his letter Willey says “to require the farmer to make a bond
guaranteeing the return of a man over whom he has no power of detention or arrest appears to me
to be most unjust.”62 Senator Fulbright responded to Willey’s concerns by explaining that he and
other Congressmen were forming a special committee, which would be determined to reach an
understanding over renegotiation of the requirements involving braceros that skip their
contracts.63 The letter from Willey and Senator Fulbright’s response highlight the close
relationship planters had with their elected officials. It also provides evidence to support the
argument that planters were willing to use their political influence once their profits or
reputations were damaged.
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In a letter, dated July 29th 1950, C.N. Houck, the vice-president of Miller Lumber
Company, wrote to Senator Fulbright explaining the labor and harvest situation in Marianna,
Arkansas. Houck says there would be a large cotton harvest that season and labor would need to
be hired from Mexico. Houck emphasized his reasons for the shortage of labor by saying, “as
you well know the labor on the farm is decreasing from year to year due to the increased use of
tractors and other farm machinery. Also due to great industrial activity very little labor is
available from the cities and towns and in addition many workers will probably be inducted into
the armed services, so that we are now faced with a large crop and a short labor supply.”64 Houck
also used his letter to Senator Fulbright to voice his grievances over the required bond planters
had to pay for each bracero, complaining about the poorly negotiated bond of 1949 and the
inability of the USIS to limit the amount of desertions by bracero workers.
Another letter highlighting the shortage of labor and the failure of the USIS to keep track
of Braceros comes from Dan Felton, a merchant, planter and ginner from Felton, Arkansas. In a
letter, dated July 29th 1950, Felton wrote Senator Fulbright voicing his concern over a shortage
of labor. Felton complained that the large harvest yield of 1950 would need a lot of labor. Felton
complained about the increased mechanization that was happening on the plantations and the
increased industrial activity in the cities. He cites these problems as the reasons for a labor
shortage in his area of the state, “due to increased mechanization we don’t have near the labor
actually living on the farms that we had in the past, this makes us dependent to a large degree on
labor hauled to the farm from cities and towns surrounding us, but due to increased industrial
activity in these populated areas it is next to impossible to get the labor required to harvest our
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crops in the fall.”65 Felton’s awareness of the impact of mechanized farm equipment and the
effect of industrial expansion in the urban areas shows he is concerned with the amount of profit
he will make. If he had to pay for recruitment and transportation of urban labor it would cut into
his profit margin. His need for labor and the lack of expenses he is willing to spend makes the
Bracero Program a perfect way for him to obtain enough labor for his harvest. Felton also
complained about the 1949 bond agreements and the heavy penalties required if braceros were
not returned to Mexico after their contracts have ended.
Felton detailed three reasons he believed the bond of 1949 was unfair. One is “many
aliens enter who are not agricultural workers and have no intention of working. They usually
disappear or skip while en-route to the farm or soon after their arrival.” 66 Second, “many after
their arrival at the farm hear of high wages in industrial cities or towns and leave for these jobs
before the departure date.”67 Third, “some of them become homesick and leave.”68 Felton
complained about the harsh penalties levied by the 1949 bond for missing or skipping braceros.
Felton insisted that all planters felt the same way, but the labor is extremely important for the
harvest. He ended his letter with a plea, to Senator Fulbright, to influence the United States
Immigration Service to strike a more favorable and reasonable deal with the Mexican
government. Senator Fulbright responded that he hoped to work with Felton and other planters to
create a better arrangement when it came to the Bracero Program.69 This letter provides ample
evidence on the ability of planters to use their political connections to influence negotiations of
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the USIS. Once planters’ finances were affected by the bond agreements of 1949, they knew
their economic power could be used to manipulate political officials.
In July of 1950, R.E.L “Bob” Wilson III was not comfortable with the amount of local
labor on hand in the area of Wilson, Arkansas. It was clear to Wilson that Lee Wilson &
Company would not be able to harvest their full acreage without the help of some type of
government assistance. Wilson’s solution was to contact Arkansas Senator, William Fulbright. In
a letter dated July 27th 1950, R.E.L. Wilson III voiced his concern that even with a steady supply
of bracero labor, he had concerns about his increasing labor needs. Wilson believed “it is of the
utmost importance that we secure Mexican National Laborers to harvest our cotton crop.”70 Later
in the letter, Wilson complained about the unfair bond agreement negotiated between the United
States and Mexico, he went on to say “there is no obligation on the part of the worker
whatsoever and there is no way for the farmer to keep the worker from leaving whenever he
wishes.”71 Wilson provided his opinion for a solution, which allowed the farmer to “be permitted
to hold out from the worker’s wages, enough money to cover the amount of the bond posted for
him and to refund this money to the worker when he is safely returned across the border.”72 As
for the issue regarding off-duty accident and sickness insurance, which was also negotiated in the
1949 bond, Wilson considered this a terrible deal because he felt it would encourage
“absenteeism and gold-bricking.”73 In the last part of his letter, Wilson encouraged the United
States government to set up and increase its enforcement by establishing a border patrol office in
the Arkansas Delta. Wilson believed this would discourage braceros from skipping their
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contracts, which costs the planter a large fee. Senator Fulbright responded to R.E.L. Wilson’s
letter, on August 1st 1950, indicating that he was interested in the problem and would discuss the
situation with other Congressman who have the same problems within their states.74 This letter is
evidence of the influence planters, such as R.E.L Wilson III, had over government officials,
especially when it came to the economic success and burden being put on the planters. This letter
also shows how vital the Bracero Program had become to Arkansas Delta planters. It was
Wilson’s belief that the only way he could produce his harvest was through the help of bracero
labor, and he was willing to use his political connections to accomplish that goal.
Another letter dated November 27th, 1959, was sent from Bob Wilson to Governor
Faubus expressing his gratitude and appreciation to Governor Faubus for granting his request for
Mexican labor at Lee Wilson & Company. “Please accept my thanks personally, and in behalf of
Lee Wilson & Company, for your invaluable assistance in placing our problems before Messrs.
McDonald and Murrell.”75 The beginning of the letter implies Wilson had a pre-existing
relationship with the governor of Arkansas, and it seems Wilson felt comfortable that his request
would be met. Later in the letter, Wilson again voiced his pleasure for being given the chance to
use Mexican labor, and also highlighted the reason behind his request for braceros. “I am very
pleased to learn that Mr. McDonald has taken the realistic and sensible attitude toward approving
authorization of Mexican Nationals when domestic labor is obviously unavailable. Your efforts
in our behalf are appreciated and will be remembered”76 Wilson made it clear his request would
not have been accomplished without the impact made by Governor Faubus. This is a great
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example of how planters used their relationship and influence over high ranking government
officials to maintain the Bracero Program. The economic benefits presented by the program gave
planters a reason to use their power and influence over the political elite. Another reason
politicians were willing to grant the requests of the planter, other than their economic influence,
was the planters inability to hire adequate numbers of domestic labor. Wilson makes it clear in
his thank you letter to Faubus that without his help they would not be able to find domestic labor.
After receiving Wilson’s thank you letter, Governor Faubus sent a letter acknowledging
his appreciation to Bob Wilson and extending the opportunity for further assistance if it was
needed. “Please let us know at any time you have problems with which we can assist.”77 This
letter is significant because it shows that even after Faubus assisted Lee Wilson & Company he
was still willing to use his political power to benefit the planter elite. He also provides Wilson
with an avenue to other government officials who could help Lee Wilson & Company with any
labor problem that might arise. “If I am not available, you can call on Mr. Jim Bland, and in his
usual efficient manner, you can count on the problem’s being handled in a proper way, if it is at
all possible.”78 This letter is an important source that shows how politicians were willing to
provide assistance to planters and were even willing to point them in the right direction if they
themselves were unavailable.
The impact and influence planters held with the political elite in Arkansas has been well
documented. These sources have provided substantial evidence to conclude that planters had
influence over their economic prosperity. Unfortunately, for local labor the influence they held
over the political elite was disastrous. In a letter, dated August 4th 1959, Earnest Dobbs wrote
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Governor Faubus regarding the braceros being sent to Jackson County. In a handwritten letter,
Mr. Dobbs told Governor Faubus there was enough people in Jackson County “to take care of all
the farming without any help from Mexicans.”79 Dobbs also informed Governor Faubus that
people in Jackson County were on the welfare rolls because they were not being offered the
farming jobs that existed in the county. Dobbs observed that the “laboring class people put you
in office and now we are asking for a little help, please keep the Mexicans out during cotton
picking. If you need a petition signed just send me one I will get it signed and returned.”80 This
plea, by Dobbs, in defense of local labor fell on deaf ears.
In a letter, dated August 17th 1959, J.N. Lewis wrote to the administrator of the
Employment Security Division, J.L. Bland regarding the letter from Dobbs. Lewis acknowledged
the discontent expressed within the letter from Dobbs, but did not focus on the things Dobbs
highlighted in his handwritten letter. Instead of focusing on the problems Dobbs informed
Governor Faubus about, Lewis provided Bland with the type of work the Dobbs family had in
Jackson County. In Lewis’ letter to Bland he says “neither Mr. or Mrs. Dobbs are agricultural
workers.” He continued by saying “Mr. Dobbs will have no trouble keeping his entire group
employed this Fall as our shortage of pickers is going to be very large.”81 This letter provides
evidence of just how little these political officials cared about their constituents, especially when
it came to local labor. Instead of reading Dobbs’ letter as a concerned citizen who viewed
bracero labor to be taking jobs from his fellow citizens, who could have used the work as a way
to get off welfare rolls, they assume all Dobbs was referencing his own job, when in fact, Dobbs
was trying to be the voice for the local people of Jackson County. This is yet another instance
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where the political elite were unwilling to waiver from their support for the planter elite, even at
the expense of local labor.
Another letter that emphasizes political favor towards the planter elite is dated November
4th 1959, from J.L. Bland to J.M. Cleveland, a manager in the Employment Security Division of
Blytheville, Arkansas. Bland wrote to Cleveland that the “Lee Wilson Company has presented to
us a proposal whereby they would plant a tremendous acreage of berries and vegetables, if we
can supply the labor.” He went on to say that “Governor Faubus and I explored this and both of
us are inclined to go along with the proposition.”82 Five days after the above letter, J.L. Bland
sent a letter to Governor Faubus, dated November 9th 1959. In this letter, Bland hailed the
production of the Mexican laborers, and how these laborers helped planters of Arkansas make
huge profits. Bland stated, “we had 40,000 Mexicans who picked more than 30 days at the low
rate and this meant more than a million dollars to the growers.”83 This letter provides a great deal
to the argument that planters used their economic influence to sway the political elite in favor of
using the bracero labor because it emphasizes the economic benefit between Mexican labor and
the cotton industry. Bland’s acknowledgment of the economic benefits provided to planters
through the Bracero Program shows how the Arkansas Department of Labor encouraged the
economic output of large plantations across the state. In the case of Jim Bland and the ESD, it
was imperative that the largest planters in the state be provided the greatest and easiest avenue to
large economic outputs. If large plantations were given the opportunity to use cheap labor, thus
increasing their overall gains, it would make Bland’s performances as administrator at the ESD
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seem more successful. Therefore, it became very important for Bland and his office to cater to
the planter elite.
After evaluating these sources, it becomes clear that the planter elite had complete control
over political officials in Arkansas. It is evident that Arkansas politicians were willing to render
their political actions to line the pockets of the planter elite. Planters knew their power over the
economy could be used to manipulate and influence political officials. As long as the planters
made it clear to politicians how important it was for them to make the most profit or save the
most money, it became second nature for them to use their political influence as a way to
enhance their economic profit.
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Conclusion:
Throughout this paper we have seen how the United States government and the planter
elite worked together to respond to downturns in the labor supply. This paper began with the
onset of World War II, a time when conflict all across the globe called for brave Americans to
offer their services to defend the ideas and values of this great republic. This call to service had
an adverse effect on the homeland and the agricultural labor situation. When the United States
entered the conflict most able bodied men volunteered or were drafted for military service, and
the men and women who could not take part in military action positioned themselves to provide
for the war effort in other ways. The main effort for men and women who were not a part of the
fighting was to offer their next greatest attribute, their labor. Even though they could not fight
against the enemy, they could still work to build the military. During the war factories were
transformed into military productions lines and operated entirely for military purposes. This fact
propelled the men and women of America to move their families out of agricultural areas and
into the industrial heartlands of the United States where they could provide a contribution to the
war effort and earn higher wages. Unfortunately for planters and large plantations, the action
taken by those Americans is what fueled the eventual need for immigrant labor. Since Americans
were moving out of the agricultural areas, in particular the South, planters needed a significant
supply of labor to keep production high and in turn contribute to the war effort in their own way.
Once it was understood that crops equaled food for the troops it became extremely
important to have the largest and most productive harvests possible. Since domestic labor had
shifted towards the industrial sector for higher wages and greater opportunity, the agricultural
sector was very limited when it came to hiring enough domestic labor to maintain the wartime
production levels. This fact prompted the United States government to act accordingly. As we
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know, their solution was to acquire Mexican immigrants. At the beginning of the Bracero
Program, the United States government maintained its priorities’ by administering the program
in a responsible and effective manner. However, once the war ended the United States
government began to show favoritism and a lack of control over the program. During the late
1940s and early 1950s the terms of the Bracero Program were increasingly dictated by the
American planter. As we have seen from documents and archival data, American farming
operations and plantations, such as Lee Wilson & Company, were more than willing to use their
power and influence over politicians to extend the program’s life span, ultimately, increasing
their economic prosperity. The planters’ willingness to exploit politicians for economic gains
signals the importance of cheap labor to planters. Not only does this exploitation underscore the
advantage of cheap labor, but it also decreases the wages and opportunities of domestic labor.
When a planter was able to legally hire a bracero, whom he could pay much lower wages, and
only pay for a short period of time, it became counter-productive to hire domestic labor. The
transition to capital intensive labor and the corresponding demise of the tenancy system played
an important role in the attitude of planters toward local labor. Under the tenancy system,
planters provided for their laborers year-round. Although the tenancy system imposed a heavy
burden of debt for the laborer, it guaranteed them a place in the agricultural sector. With the
emergence of scientific agriculture- the use of machines and chemicals- planters no longer
needed year-round labor and their responsibilities that accompanied it. It was more expedient for
them to use season laborers.
The Bracero Program was meant to be a quick fix, but it ended up becoming a very
lucrative business, one that provided millions of jobs to Mexican workers, but also took away
hundreds of thousands of jobs that could have been fielded by domestic workers. The Bracero
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Program’s track record is mixed, especially in the Arkansas Delta. On the one hand, it helped
keep production levels high and labor costs low for planters. On the other hand, it allowed
planters to gain favorable treatment and political influence over countless government officials.
Considering these facts, it is difficult to view the influx of Mexican immigrants we have today as
a new phenomenon. When it comes to cheap agricultural labor, American planters continue to
look to Mexico to supply that labor. Whether it be through government sanctioned programs,
such as the Bracero Program, or recruiting Mexican immigrants from border towns, the planter
elite and now the large manufacturing producers, such as Tyson Foods, will always find the most
cost effective means of production.
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